He has also enacted or promoted a more aggressive foreign policy, particularly with regard to China's relations with the U.S., the nine-dash line in the South China Sea, the Sino-Indian border dispute, and the political status of Taiwan. His anti-corruption campaign led to the downfall of prominent incumbent and retired CCP officials, including Zhou Yongkang, a former member of the PSC. Since assuming power, Xi has introduced far-ranging measures to enforce party discipline and to impose internal unity. Xi is the first CCP general secretary born after the establishment of the PRC. He officially received the title of leadership core from the CCP in 2016. In 2008, he was designated as Hu Jintao's presumed successor as paramount leader to that end, Xi was appointed vice president of the PRC and vice chairman of the CMC. He subsequently joined the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) of the CCP the same year and was first secretary of the Central Secretariat in October 2007. Following the dismissal of the party secretary of Shanghai, Chen Liangyu, Xi was transferred to replace him for a brief period in 2007. Xi was governor of Fujian from 1999 to 2002, before becoming governor and party secretary of neighboring Zhejiang from 2002 to 2007. After studying chemical engineering at Tsinghua University as a worker-peasant-soldier student, Xi rose through the ranks politically in China's coastal provinces. He lived in a yaodong in the village of Liangjiahe, Shaanxi province, where he joined the CCP after several failed attempts and worked as the local party secretary. The son of Chinese Communist veteran Xi Zhongxun, Xi was exiled to rural Yanchuan County as a teenager following his father's purge during the Cultural Revolution. 2007–2012: Leader, Central Coordination Group for Hong Kong and Macau Affairs.2007–2012: Leader, Leading Group for Activities of Deepening the Study and Practice of the Outlook of Scientific Development 2007–2012: Leader Group for Party Building.2012–2018: Leader, Foreign Affairs Leading Group.2012–present: Leader, Central Leading Group for Taiwan Affairs.2013–2018: Leader, Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms.2013–2018: Leader, Leading Group for Financial and Economic Affairs.2013–present: Chairman, National Security Commission.2014–2018: Leader, Leading Group for Internet Security and Informatization.2014–present: Leader, Leading Group for Defence and Military Reform.2018–present: Director, Central Comprehensively Deepening Reforms Commission.2018–present: Director, Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission.2018–present: Director, Central Foreign Affairs Commission.2018–present: Director, Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission.This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title. Working Paper: The impact of investment incentives: evidence from UK corporation tax returns (2016) JEL-codes: D25 G31 H25 H32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)Ĭitations: View citations in EconPapers (36) Track citations by RSS feedĪccess to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers. Discontinuity at notches in the cost of capital at the qualifying thresholds does not affect our results. We exploit variation in the timing of tax payments to show that this effect is primarily due to the change in the cost of capital, rather than a relaxation of financial constraints. The investment rate of qualifying companies increased by 2.1–2.5 percentage points relative to those that did not qualify. Using UK corporation tax returns, we provide evidence on the effects of accelerated depreciation allowances on investment, exploiting exogenous changes in the qualifying thresholds for first-year depreciation allowances (FYAs) in 2004. The Impact of Investment Incentives: Evidence from UK Corporation Tax ReturnsĪmerican Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2019, vol.
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